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ABSTRACT
The Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of
China underwent significant amendments in 2014, the background,
process, main contents, and preliminary effects of which will be
examined in this paper.
Generally speaking, the amendments have made a powerful
response to issues besetting the judicial review of agency action in
China, especially the “difficulties in getting an administrative
lawsuit registered, adjudicating administrative cases, and executing
court decisions.” After the amended Administrative Litigation Law
came into effect, the acceptance of first instance administrative
lawsuits increased sharply, the plaintiff’s winning rate rose slightly,
and the reform of the administrative reconsideration and petition
mechanisms were further advanced.
In my opinion, the
amendments have achieved the legislators’ desired results, and the
administrative litigation in China is embracing the best ever period
in its history.
However, the deep-seated problems that have troubled
administrative litigation for years still exist. Courts’ review of
normative documents, the collateral review of local regulations, and
the acceptance of public interest litigation have all been evaded.
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Furthermore, full independence and authority of administrative
trials still requires an overall judicial and political reform.
Consequently, administrative adjudication still faces a difficult path.
The amendments of the Administrative Litigation Law not only
reflect the efforts to promote the rule of law in this era, but also
illustrate the limitations of the process under the rule of law in
China at this stage.
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The Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic
of China (hereinafter referred to as the “Law”) underwent
significant amendments for the past twenty-five years since its
promulgation in 2014. It was hoped that the amendments would
solve difficulties in settling administrative disputes and help
establish the rule of law in China. This paper will examine the
background, courses, main contents and the preliminary effects of
the amendments. The author is mainly concerned with the
following issue: the leading party proclaims that this era seeks to
“promote the rule of law in an all-round manner,” but how much
progress may the amendments bring to China’s legal system
construction?
I.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LITIGATION LAW AMENDMENTS
A. The Symbol of Democracy and the Rule of Law
The current administrative litigation system in China was
established by the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (the “1989
Law”). The 1989 Law was adopted by China’s highest institution
of state power—the National People’s Congress (hereinafter
referred to as the “NPC”) on the eve of the “Tiananmen Incident,”
and was scheduled to take effect in October 1990—a year and a half
later. It is not common to deliberate and adopt a law by a group of
nearly 3000 deputies in China; in fact, it is rare to spend one and a
half years on preparing for a legislation. This is a sign of this
country’s grave and arduous transition to a modern governance
system.
The Law allows citizens and organizations to file a
complaint against the peoples’ government or its divisions regarding
their action or inaction in the peoples’ courts at different levels, with
the latter hearing the case. It is a totally new attempt in China’s
traditional bureaucracy and contemporary party-state system that an
independent judicial body, instead of the administrative agency’s
superior, examines the action of the agency concerned. Fully aware
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of the impacts and difficulties in the implementation of the Law, the
Legislators were cautious and granted a relatively limited power to
courts in the Law.
Citizens may litigate against specific
administrative decisions, but may not file a lawsuit against generally
applicable normative documents. Courts may only judge the
legality of administrative action according to laws and regulations
and may not review with principle administrative discretion, nor
could courts review the constitutionality of laws and regulations.
The promulgation of the Law has been deemed from the
beginning as a significant event in the construction of democracy
and rule of law in China. The government and academic circles
have held activities to mark the fifth, the tenth and twentieth
anniversary of the Law’s promulgation, and the mass media has
widely publicized in celebration of the law. Courts nationwide have
accepted and concluded more than 2.1 million administrative
lawsuits by 2014. By a rough estimate, one-fourth of the plaintiffs
had got some sort of relief through litigation. Administrative
litigation has also helped increase the awareness of administration
by law and promoted the perfection of the administrative law
system. Without administrative litigation, many of the plaintiffs
would have been still running on the road to petition, and many of
the officials would not have heard of terms such as “excess of
power” or “due process.” “The significance of The Law can never
be overstated,”1 said Professor Ying Songnian (应松年), who has
been involved in drafting the Law.
B. Predicaments of Administrative Litigation
Nevertheless, the implementation of the Law has proved to
be unusually difficult. Ordinary people described administrative
1

Ying Songnian (应松年), Zhongguo Xingzhengfa de Chuangzhi yu Mianlin
de Wenti (中国行政法的创制与面临的问题) [The Making and Problems of
Chinese Administrative Law], 1 Jianghai ACAD. J (2001). For more discussion, see
Ying Songnian, Yu Fa Tong Xing (与法同行：应松年口述) [WALK WITH LAW:
YING SONGNIAN’S NARRATION] (China Univ. Political Sci. & Law Press 2016), at
107, 183 (discussing the Law and its repercussions).
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litigation as “hurling an egg against a rock,” judges mocked
themselves as “living in the crevice,” and scholars’ descriptions
were filled with words such as “hardship” and “predicament.”2
Prior to the amendments of the Law, the National People’s Congress
Legislative Affairs Commission (hereinafter referred as the
“Commission”) summarized in its survey report the predicaments of
administrative litigation as a “difficulty in getting an administrative
lawsuit registered, a difficulty in adjudicating administrative cases,
plus a difficulty in executing court decisions.”3 The “Three
Difficulties” were widely accepted and set the tone for future
legislation.
1. The Difficulty in Getting an Administrative Lawsuit
Registered
2

For a comprehensive investigation of the situation, see generally Gong
Xiangrui (龚祥瑞), IDEAL AND REALITY OF THE RULE OF LAW: REPORT ON THE
ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LITIGATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (法治的理想与现实)
(China Univ. Political Sci. & Law Press 1993); Lin Lihong (林莉红), IDEAL AND
REALITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE OF LAW: REPORT ON THE EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW
(行政法治的理想与现实) (Peking Univ. Press 2014) (each describing the
implementation of the Law). For discussion in English journals, see generally
Susan Finder, Like Throwing an Egg against a Stone: Administrative Litigation in
the People's Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 1 (1989) (discussing the history
of administrative litigation in China and analyzing the provisions of the
Administrative Litigation Law ); Pei Minxin, Citizens vs. Mandarins:
Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 832 (1997) (examining the
patterns of administrative litigation after the enactment of the Administrative
Litigation Law and evaluating the effectiveness of the Law’s implementation);
Kevin O’Brien & Li Lianjiang, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in
Rural China, 51 CHINA J. 75 (2004) (relating the implementation of the Law in
rural China); He Haibo, Litigations without a Ruling: The Predicaments of
Administrative Law in China, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 257 (2011) (focusing on
the administrative implementations and repercussions of the Law).
3
Xin Chunying (信春鹰), Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng
Susong Fa Xiuzhengan Cao’an de Shuoming (关于中华人民共和国行政诉讼法
修正案草案的说明) [Explanations on the Amendment of the Administrative
Litigation Law of the PRC], the Sixth Plenary Session of the 12th Standing
Committee of the NPC on Dec. 23, 2013.
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The most prominent problem in implementing the Law is the
difficulty in getting an administrative lawsuit registered. Lawsuits
of sensitive areas relating to birth control (early stage), land
expropriation and house removal, town planning and illegally-built
structure demolition, and business shut-down, where there were
intensive disputes and frequent mass incidents, were found
especially difficult to enter litigation. Some courts simply did not
accept any such cases. “The work in our division is to battle against
the ordinary people with wits and courage,” said a judge of the
lawsuit-registration division who does not wish to give out his
name, “and to make every attempt to not register the lawsuit.” A
chief judge of a High People’s Court administrative division
estimated that, in his jurisdictional area, about one-third of all the
lawsuits filed with the courts were accepted. Because a large
number of lawsuits were rejected by the courts and could not be
resolved through litigation, those people concerned had to turn to
petitioning. According to Professor Yu Jianrong’s 2004 survey, 401
out of 632 farmers who went to Beijing for petitions had filed a
lawsuit about their problems with the local court before they turned
to petitioning; 172 lawsuits were rejected by the court, accounting
for forty-three percent of the total.4 The lawsuits the courts rejected
were mainly government-involved disputes.
The difficulty in getting an administrative lawsuit registered
was shown statistically by the small number of administrative cases.
In 2014, 141,880 administrative cases of first instance were
accepted by the courts nationwide, which created a historical record
before the Law was amended.5 But what did the number suggest? It
represents a fractional ratio of one administrative case for around
4

Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), Zhongguo Xinfang Zhidu de Kunjing he Chulu (中国
信访制度的困境和出路) [Plight of China’s Petitioning System and Way out], 1
STRATEGY & MGMT. (2009).
5
The statistic here and the ones below on administrative litigation, unless
otherwise stated, have been provided by the Supreme People’s Court Research
Office Statistics Division. Some of them may be found in the Law Yearbook of
China (中国法律年鉴) of respective year. Readers may also see the relative parts
of He Haibo’ Administrative Litigation Law (Law Press China 2016).
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ten thousand people, and fewer than forty administrative cases for a
court on average. Many courts accepted and heard fewer than ten
administrative cases throughout a year. Among the nine million
various cases of first instance accepted and heard by the courts
nationwide, only 1.5 percent were administrative cases. Compared
with 4-6 million petitions arising from administrative disputes to the
Bureau for Letters and Visits at various level per year,
administrative cases were almost trivial.6 Compared with other
countries, there were surprisingly fewer administrative cases in
China. France has only a population of sixty million, equal to that
of the seventh largest province in China, but French local
administrative courts heard 190 thousand cases a year, which is
more than that by the total of Chinese courts.7 Given the fact that in
China, administrative dispute resolution is not required in principle
to “exhaust administrative remedies,” and disputes handled (not
solved) through administrative reconsideration are no more than the
ones through administrative litigation, 140 thousand cases in a year
is really a small number.
2. Difficulty in Adjudicating Administrative Cases
The difficulty in adjudicating administrative cases was at
first manifested when only a fraction of administrative cases were
closed with judgement. In previous years before the amendments,
the courts only closed fewer than thirty percent of the administrative
cases with judgment, which was even lower than that of civil cases.
Where were the remaining cases then? The courts had actually
found various reasons to dismiss the lawsuits instead of entering
substantive judgment. A substantial number of cases, with fifteen
percent in a year at its utmost before the law’s amendment, were
simply dismissed by the court. More cases ended because the courts
6

Sun Qian (孙乾), Min Gao Guan Xinfang Anjian Nian Chao 400 Wan Jian
(“民告官”信访案件年超400万件)[Citizen v. Official Type Petitions Over 4
Million per Year], Beijing Times, Nov.5, 2014, p.3.
7
THE
CONSEIL
D'ÉTAT,
http://english.conseil-etat.fr/Judging
[https://perma.cc/9CMC-RFDQ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
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have tried to persuade the plaintiffs to withdraw. The withdrawal
rate has never been lower than thirty percent since after the Law
became effective, and the highest one reached fifty-seven percent.
The low rate of judgement stemmed partly from the authority’s
efforts to advocate a judicial policy of coordination and
reconciliation. But the main reason was that the courts did not have
strong political and legal backing and they were unable to render a
fair judgment according to law.8
Another manifestation of the difficulty in adjudicating
administrative cases was the low rate of plaintiffs’ win by court
adjudication and the consequently high appeal and petition rates.
Plaintiff first instance winning rate dropped all the way from twenty
percent when the Law was first implemented to eight percent in
years before the amendments. Almost eighty percent of the parties
of all cases closed by judgement would appeal against the court
judgment. Ninety percent of the appellants were plaintiffs, and
agencies only accounted for five percent. The bias at the first trial
can be seen at a glance. One may assume that courts of the second
instance might handle the appeals more in favor of the citizens.
However, only less than ten percent was favorable to the appellants
and seventy percent to eighty percent was favorable to the appellees.
Putting them together, only one out of ten citizens won by judgment
at the first and second instances. Due to the low winning rate at the
first and second instances, the rate of petition to a further higher
court of administrative cases was several times higher than that of
civil cases.
Evidently, the low winning rate of citizens could not be
ascribed to good law enforcement by agencies. According to a
judge who is unwilling to reveal his identity, administrative actions
filed with the court were mostly questionable, and half of them
should have been revoked (but the judge did not do so). The courts
in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, once executed cross-regional
jurisdiction, namely, to transfer cases against agencies of County A
8

He Haibo, supra note 2.
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to the court in County B for trial, and those against agencies of
County B to the court in County C. The one year’s result showed
that the government’s losing rate reached 62.5 percent.9 Beginning
in July 2014, all the courts in Henan Province executed crossregional jurisdiction across the whole province and the one-year
result showed that the government’s losing rate reached 28.6
percent, 18 percent higher than that before the cross-regional
jurisdiction was practiced.10 As cross-regional jurisdiction was less
subject to administrative interference, the losing rate of Taizhou and
Henan seemed to be more reflective of the actual level of
administrative law enforcement and the potential level that judicial
review in China should have reached.
The third manifestation of the difficulty in adjudicating an
administrative case was that citizens rarely won a case in the real
9

Sun Wenying (孙文鹰) & Huang Xian’an (黄献安), Xingzheng Anjian Yidi
Shenpan: “Chen Chongguan Men” Xianxing Yibu (行政案件异地审判：“陈崇
冠们”先行一步) [Cross-Regional Trial of Administrative Cases, Chen
Chongguan and His Colleagues One Step Ahead], PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY (Feb.
5,
2004),
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2004/02/id/103160.shtml
[https://perma.cc/W2VW-2TQ3] (summarizing cases that stimulated the Chief
Justice of Zhejiang Intermediate People’s Court Administrative Tribunal, Chen
Chongguan, to implement the mode of remote cross-regional trials of
administrative cases and providing statistics of the result). For more discussion,
see Zheng Chunyan (郑春燕) & Chen Chongguan (陈崇冠), Guanyu Xingzheng
Anjian Yidi Jiaocha Shenpan Moshi de Sikao (关于行政案件异地交叉审判模式
的思考), 1 J. OF ZHEJIANG GONGSHANG, (2005) (reflecting on the mode of a
remote cross-regional trial of administrative cases based on its establishment,
formalization, and legal theories); ADMIN. TRIBUNAL OF SUPREME PEOPLE'S
COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-32 (Law Press
China, Ser. No. 4. 2007) (providing a report on administrative cases of crossjurisdiction in Zhejiang Province); He Cailin (何才林), Jiafeng Zhong de Biange
(夹缝中的变革), 10 PEKING U. L. REV. (2009) (discussing the outcomes of crossregional jurisdiction reform in certain courts).
10
Shi Yan (时岩), Henan Min Gao Guan An Yidi Guanxia Gaige: Geduan
Difang Zhengfu Guanxi Wang (河南民告官案异地管辖改革：割断地方政府关
系网) [Reform on Cross-Regional Jurisdiction of Cases against Authorities
Brought by Ordinary People: Sever Local Government’s Network], PEOPLE’S
DAILY
ONLINE,
(Aug.
11,
2015),
http://henan.people.com.cn/n/2015/0811/c356896-25927749.html
[https://perma.cc/4TAK-6C8A].
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sense. In some cases, the court revoked the administrative action in
question or ordered the agency to perform its duties. It seemed that
citizens had won their cases, but the cases were actually switched
back to center on administrative procedures. The litigation would
probably have to go through the procedures again after the agency at
issue enters a new decision. Some extreme case even went over
many rounds. Some disputes involved both an administrative action
and the interests of a third party. The party concerned had to
proceed separately with the civil action and administrative litigation.
Unfortunately, much energy was wasted on many pointless things
due to the lack of coordination on the courts’ side. In one extreme
case, the parties got twenty-eight judgments and rulings of different
courts in different procedures in ten years but were still on the way
of petition.11 In such circumstances, a citizen could only get an
empty win at best, and the dispute had not been really settled.
3. Difficulty in Executing Court Decisions
The difficulty in execution was not a common problem in
the past. There were not many administrative cases of compulsory
execution (including cases when a citizen was the obligator). These
cases dropped from the highest forty thousand pieces to fewer than
ten thousand pieces in recent years, accounting for only 4.6 percent
of administrative cases. There are even fewer conflicts relating to
execution on record in statistics, which may suggest that litigants
increasingly obey the effective court’s judgments and resistance is
decreasing. The other reason may be that the court had already
ruled out some tough cases while they put cases on file and
considered subsequent disposition while they adjudicated a case.
Thus, difficulty in execution was overshadowed by the difficulties
in case registration and adjudication.
Nonetheless, there were still a few difficult cases of
11

Wang Guisong (王贵松), Xingzheng yu Minshi Zhengyi Jiaozhi de Nanti (行
政与民事争议交织的难题) [The Conundrum of Interwoven Cases of Civil
Action and Administrative Litigation: Reflection from Jiaozuo Real Estate
Dispute] (Law Press 2005).
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execution, especially when there was strong resistance from the
agency. In FAN Zhanfei v. Department of Land and Resources of
Shaanxi Province, the plaintiff won a case concerning mining
license in the High Court. The losing defendant went so far as to
hold a multi-department coordination meeting to veto the effective
court judgment.12 In another extreme case, a court in Hunan
Province ruled that a Tianjin public security sub-bureau should pay
five million yuan in compensation but it was still not executed
twelve years later, even though the Supreme People’s Court
expressed its concern and the Central Political and Legislative
Affairs Committee of the Communist Party sent a letter.13 Although
such phenomenon is not common, it actually serves as a touchstone
which reflects the incompetency of the judiciary and helplessness in
the face of resistance. Such phenomenon has aggravated the
public’s impression that the court is useless and further dampen the
parties’ confidence in administrative litigation.
C. The Law is in “Urgent Need of Amendment”
Judges have long known the problems in implementing the
12

Wang Wenzhi (王文志) & Xiao Bo (肖波), Shan Guotuting Fou le Fayuan
Panjue (陕西国土厅否了法院判决) [Department of Land and Resources of
Shaanxi Province Vetoed the Court Judgment and Intensified the Ming Right
Dispute],
THE
ECON.
OBSERVER
(July
19,
2010),
http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/yw/2010-07/19/content_238609.htm
[https://perma.cc/2AHW-GVL2]; Zhao Lei (赵蕾), Shannxi Guotuting Foujue
Fayuan Panjue Shiya Zuigaoyuan Yaoqiu Gaipan (陕西国土厅否决法院判决 施
压最高院要求改判) [Department of Land and Resources of Shaanxi Province
Vetoed the Court Judgment and Pressed the Supreme People’s Court to Amend the
Judgment], SOUTHERN WKLY. (Aug. 5, 2010).
13
Wu Yi (吴意),Zhixing Nan, Nan Yu Shang Qingtian? (执行难，难于上青
天？) [It is Easier to Climb to Heaven than to Execute a Judgement]. 10 CHINESE
LAWYER (2007); He Xin (贺信), Panpei 500 Wan Gonganju 12 Nian Bu Zhixing
Xingzheng Panjue Zhixing Nan Beihou de Kunjing (判赔500万公安局12年不执
行 行政判决执行难背后的困境) [The Court Ruled that Tianjin Tanggu Public
Security Sub-bureau Should Pay 5 Million Yuan Compensation But the Subbureau has not Executed It 12 Years Later]. NANFANG METROPOLIS DAILY (Apr.
24,
2008),
http://www.360doc.com/content/08/0428/14/142_1220805.shtml
[https://perma.cc/B4BT-2B4R].
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Law. The court has made a great effort to settle the predicaments.
However, judicial efforts are subject to the restrictions of the Law
and, consequently, amending the Law is inevitable.
At first, judges have overcome some deficiencies of the
Law’s existing rules through an innovative interpretation of them.
For instance, the court has attempted to break through the original
restrictions on personal right and property right and incorporated the
right to education and “other legitimate rights” into litigation so that
the scope of administrative litigation could be expanded.14 The
court may on the basis of the “due process principle” revoke
administrative actions so as to strengthen review of the legality of
administrative actions, although legislation does not explicitly
provide for administrative procedures.15 If an agency does not,
when it takes an administrative action, inform the interested party of
the content or the relief approach and application deadline, the
plaintiff shall be granted an extended time limit (beyond the
statutory time limit of three months) for filing his complaint. These
judicial innovations were altogether embodied in the “Ninety-eight
Provisions of Judicial Interpretation” issued in 2000.16 They show
14

He Haibo (何海波), Xingzheng Susong Shouan Fanwei: Yiye Sifa Quan de
Shijian Shi (1990-2000) (行政诉讼受案范围：一页司法权的实践史 (19902000)) [Expanding the Scope of Administrative Litigation: One Page History of
Judicial Practice 1990 – 2000], 4 PEKING U. L. REV. (Ser. No. 2, 2002); Thomas
Kellogg, “Courageous Explorers”?: Education Litigation and Judicial
Innovation in China, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141 (2007).
15
He Haibo, The Dawn of the Due Process Principle in China, 22 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 57–118 (2008).
16
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xingzheng Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于执行中华人
民共和国行政诉讼法若干问题的解释) [The Supreme People’s Court Judicial
Interpretation of Several Issues Relating to the Implementation of the
Administrative
Litigation
Law
of
the
PR]
(2000),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/lfzt/2014/2013-12/20/content_1817962.htm
[https://perma.cc/7KVS-VAHX]; see Jiang Bixin (江必新), The Contribution of
Judicial Interpretation to the Development of Administrative Law Theories (司法
解释对行政理论法学的发展), 4 CHINA LEGAL SCI. 36 (2001) (analyzing the
effect of People’s Supreme Court’s explanation on several issues regarding the
execution of the Administrative Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of
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the potentials of a dynamic judicial system even in the case of
limited judicial authority. Nevertheless, judges cannot ignore the
legal restrictions in their innovations and such innovations by a few
bold judges cannot represent the general practice.
In addition, judges have tried other methods to flexibly
handle administrative cases to ease the difficulties in getting an
administrative lawsuit registered and adjudicating administrative
cases. For instance, some courts experimented on a “round table
trial” to avoid the rigidness of traditional court setting. Specifically,
the plaintiff, the defendant and the judge are all seated at one table
and talk and negotiate in a civil manner.17 Some courts, considering
potential dilemmas after a case is registered, conducted “pre-action
mediation.” Namely, the court first mediates between the two
parties before registering the lawsuit brought by the plaintiff. If
both parties accept the mediation, the court will not need to put the
case on file (even if the mediation fails). Coordination is the most
widely used by the court to persuade plaintiffs to withdraw.
Because the Law prohibits mediation, judges renamed their practice
as “coordination,” which is actually disguised mediation.
Coordination has long been used extensively in administrative
litigation. Judges even consider it for some time as a “new mode”
of administrative trial under the influence of official documents.
However, such measures are simply reluctant choices of judges who
cannot decide cases according to law. These measures fail to
substantially benefit plaintiffs in most cases.18
What’s more, many courts actively approach local Party
Committees and governments and closely follow the “central task”
of the locality for the purpose of obtaining the above two’s support
to administrative trials. As a proverb puts it, “help but do not cause
China).
17
Zheng Chunsun (郑春笋), Min Gao Guan An Yuanzhuo Shen Xieshang
Duihua Hao Kuansong (民告官案圆桌审 协商对话好宽松), LEGAL DAILY (July
24,
2008),
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/200807/24/content_908113.htm?node=10.
18
He Haibo, supra note 2, at 257.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/7

[2018]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

151

troubles.” A grassroots administrative division chief judge, who has
been awarded the title of Outstanding Individual of National
Administrative Trial but who does not wish to disclose his name
here, explained to me his trade-off theory: the court will give
unconditional support to the administrative action concerning the
local government’s “central task,” and for the rest of administrative
cases, the local government should respect the court and be
supportive. Such an approach sacrifices judicial independence,
violates the principle of the rule of law, and radically undermines
judicial status and authority.
Although the court has made various efforts, administrative
litigation is still in straitened circumstances and is unable to get rid
of the predicaments. Chief Judge Zhao Daguang (赵大光) of the
Supreme People’s Court Administrative Division appealed loudly at
the 2014 Annual Administrative Law Conference that the
administrative litigation system had come to a “dead end” and must
be amended.19 The court system’s insignificant legal and political
power further increased the necessity of the amendment.
II.

COURSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION
LAW AMENDMENT

A. Start-up
The legislature has noticed the demand for amending the
Law in an early time. The Standing Committee of the NPC
included this item in the five-year legislative schedules in 2003 as a
program to “discuss, prepare a draft and arrange for deliberation at
due time.” The Standing Committee included it again in the fiveyear legislative schedules in 2008 as “a draft bill to be submitted for
deliberation within its term of office.”20 But it would not be
19

August 23, 2014, Zhengzhou City, Henan Province.
Legislative Schedule of the Tenth National People’s Congress Standing
Committee (十届全国人大常委会立法规划), PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Dec.18,
2003),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/14957/2252949.html
[https://perma.cc/2W2V-FPUN]; Legislative Schedule of the Eleventh National
20
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arranged for deliberation until the next NPC Standing Committee
holds its session. The Law, enacted in 1989 and remained
untouched since, is almost the oldest law in contemporary China
where the legal system is going through rapid development and
frequent revisions. In comparison, the Civil Procedure Law and the
Criminal Procedure Law have undergone respectively two major
amendments since that period.
Whether it is the right time for legislation is much related to
the political climate. The Law was adopted exactly along with the
upsurge of political reforms in the 1980s. It is hard to imagine the
enactment of the Law without that trend. Afterwards, the political
reform receded to a low ebb, and it was very difficult to put major
reforms on the agenda. On the technical level, the Supreme
People’s Court itself can perfect the Law (and it has frequently done
so), but no real improvement at the system level can be made unless
there is a resolution from the top political authority. None of the
major issues involved in the administrative litigation system, such
as incorporating normative documents into the scope of
administrative litigation, raising the level of trial courts on a large
scale or excluding local government’s interference with court trials,
will concern the adjustment between judicature and administration
and the Party Committee. None of these issues will be tackled
without the resolution of the top political authority.
It is not always a good time for a legal reform. There was an
obvious “regression” after 2006 in the Chinese political and legal
system under the control of Zhou Yongkang (周永康), who was
later sentenced for corruption. Instead of underlining the court’s
People’s Congress Standing Committee (十一届全国人大常委会立法规划), the
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/200810/29/content_1455985.htm
[https://perma.cc/2A3X-XJ4M].
For
more
information of legislative plan, see Kan Ke (阚珂), Look back on the NPC
Standing Committee’s Legislative Planning Work (回望全国人大常委会的立法
规划工作),
NAT’L
PEOPLE’S
CONGRESS,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/lfdt/2013-11/07/content_1812837.htm
[https://perma.cc/56YT-2NM8] (describing the NPC Standing Committee’s
legislative planning work).
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independence in trial, officials at each level demanded an adherence
to “absolute leadership of the Party;” instead of underlining trial
according to law, they chased a “unity of three effects” (i.e.,
political effect, social effect, and legal effect); instead of demanding
the court to adjudicate cases decisively, they demanded the court to
do “grand mediation” and “grand reception of petitions”.21 It was
doubtful during that time that an amendment of law would achieve
the desired effect. An official of the Legislative Affairs Commission
stated at a meeting in early 2009 that amendments should touch
major issues and facilitate the improvement of the system. But if it
was not done correctly, effectuating the amendments might lead to
regression.22 Some judges and scholars were also concerned about
the bad timing for amending the Law, which might not result in a
positive effect.
After the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, the leadership redressed the deviation, and “rule of law” and
“judicial reform” became hot topics again. Amending the Law was
really put on the agenda this time. In November 2013, the Third
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC proposed
to build the rule of law in China, announcing the goal to make the
masses feel fair and just in every judicial case. In October 2014, the
last critical moment for amending the Law, the Fourth Plenary
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC released a signal
of “comprehensive promotion of the rule of law” and put forward a
number of measures relating to the administrative litigation system.
Among the highlights were “to perfect the system and mechanisms
of administrative litigation, to moderately adjust the administrative
lawsuit jurisdiction system, to effectively solve the prominent
problems of difficulties in getting an administrative lawsuit
registered, adjudicating administrative cases and executing court
21

He Haibo (何海波), Xingzheng Fazhi, Women Haiyou Duo Yuan (行政法
治，我们还有多远？) [Administrative Rule of Law, How Far Away are We from
It?], 6 TRIB. OF POL. SCI. & L. (2013).
22
NPC Legislative Affairs Comm’n, Forum on Administrative Litigation Law
at Henan Hotel in Beijing (Jan.21, 2009).
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decisions,” “to improve the rules on agency’s appearance in court,
to support the court to accept and hear administrative cases, and to
respect and execute effective court decisions.”23 That, under the
party-state system, can be deemed as the political determination and
supreme authorization for amending the Law.
Compared to the past, the time for amending the Law could
not be any better.
B. Participating Parties
The amendment of the Law, as a typical process of
legislation and with the NPC Standing Committee as the center,
involved many parties.
1. Legislative Affairs Commission
At the NPC level, the Legislative Affairs Commission is
mainly responsible for the amendment of the Law.
This
Commission consists of nearly 200 legislative experts who are
responsible for drawing up major draft bills, and since 2007 the
whole process of legislative work includes the overall planning,
organization, coordination, guidance and service. There are about
one dozen experts in the Administrative Law Office of the
Commission who are responsible for major administrative
legislation. This Office has drafted basic laws, including the
Administrative Penalty Law, the Administrative Licensing Law, and
the Administrative Coercion Law, and has completed the
amendments of a series of important laws including the
Environmental Protection Law.
Compared with other state institutions (including the court),
the Commission is in a more detached position and the experts have
23

Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Zhiguo Ruogan
Zhongda Wenti de Jueding (中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的
决定) [Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on a Number of Major
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law], adopted at the
Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC on Oct. 23,
2014.
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a better understanding of the actual situation of the administrative
litigation. But after all, this Commission does not have formal
legislative power and thus cannot decide major issues. It is at best a
coordinator of the opinions of all parties. The Commission needs to
first act on the orders of the Central Committee of the CPC and the
NPC, then coordinate the opinions of the court, the people’s
procuratorate, the legal affairs office and other departments, and
listen to the public, the scholars and others in the society. The
impacts of its efforts also depend on whether the draft bills it draws
up can be adopted by a massive majority vote among the 152 NPC
Standing Committee members.
2. Other State Organs
Courts aspire to amend the Law, pay earnest attention to
amending the Law, and have the closest association with the
Commission. Judges have accompanied the Commission officials
in most of their surveys. The Supreme People’s Court has drafted
its version of amendments to the Law and submitted to the
Commission, and the leading Party group of the Supreme People’s
Court has twice submitted opinions on specific issues to the
Commission.24 Compared with scholars’ opinions, the opinions of
24

These opinions are not publicly disclosed. But one can learn about the
Supreme People’s Court’s basic standpoint from the work of the Supreme
People’s Court judges. See generally Jiang Bixin (江必新) & Cai Xiaoxue (蔡小
雪), ZHONGGUO XINGZHENG SUSONG ZHIDU DE WANSHAN: XINGZHENG SUSONG
FA XIUGAI WENTI SHIWU YANJIU (中国行政诉讼制度的完善：行政诉讼法修改
问题实务研究) [Perfection of the Chinese Administrative Litigation System:
Study on the Practice of Administrative Litigation Law Amendments] (Law Press
China 2005) (analyzing the Administrative Litigation Law through 11 different
questions); Jiang Bixin (江必新), Wanshan Xingzheng Susong Zhidu de Ruogan
Sikao (完善行政诉讼制度的若干思考)[Some Thoughts on Perfecting the
Administrative Litigation System]), 1 CHINA LEGAL SCI., 5 (2013) (discussing
current practical problems with the Administrative Litigation Law, and providing
suggestions to amend the Law); Li Guangyu (李广宇), Wang Zhenyu (王振宇) &
Liang Fengyun (梁凤云), Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai Ying Guanzhu Shi Da
Wenti (行政诉讼法修改应关注十大问题) [Ten Major Issues in the Amendment
of Administrative Litigation Law], 3 J. L. APPLICATION (2013) (detailing the major
problems in the amendment to the Administrative Litigation Law).
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the courts receive more attention. Judges say in private to the
Commission officials, “thank you for helping us solve the
problems,” and the Commission officials would say, “we are a
family. It’s our pleasure.” Notwithstanding the above, the
Commission will not take all the demands in the list.
The function of the people’s procuratorate is not that
prominent and its demands are relatively simple. It expects the Law
to grant them a more powerful status, to represent the public
interest, to bring administrative lawsuits alongside the courts, and to
supervise, as the guardian of law, the whole process of
administrative litigation.
The attitude of the government legal departments appears to
be comparatively negative. Although the government makes great
efforts to build “governance by law,” it is concerned that judicial
intervention will disturb government agencies’ routine work and
exceed administration officials’ capacity. Government law officers
rarely publish articles, hold discussions, or state their stands in
public. But the Commission cannot ignore their attitudes. The
Commission needs to persuade the Legal Affairs Office of the State
Council to accept major institutional changes or at least not to
strongly oppose the changes. The provision that reconsideration
organ shall be the defendant was adopted in the draft bill partly as
the Legal Affairs Office of the State Council compromised. The
people’s procuratorate failed to represent the public interest and to
sue against the agency mainly because the objection of the
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council.
3．The Public, NPC Deputies and Legal Scholars
The public is very interested in amending the Law. The
NPC Standing Committee published the draft amendments twice to
solicit public comments and the public showed considerable
enthusiasm.25 It is reported that that more than 4,000 citizens
25

The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China,
Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiuzhengan (Caoan) Tiaowen (行政诉讼法修正案草案条
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nationwide responded with 7,736 pieces of comments in total.26
Some NPC deputies also offered their opinions one after another.
These opinions may not be very professional or operational, but
they reflected the people’s concerns and dissatisfactions with the
Law. The public complained about the “difficulty in getting
administrative lawsuits registered with the court,” that they could
not “see the defendant agency official in court,” and that the
reconsideration organ simply sustained the original action, which
deeply impressed the legislature. The legislature eventually
responded to the public complaints.
Social organizations in China are underdeveloped. Legal
scholars largely act as the spokespersons for public interest and
consultants of the legislature. Administrative law scholars have
been calling for amendments of the Law for years, which was
frequently reported by the media. The Chinese Administrative Law
Society and other academic organizations have held a great number
of discussions in the course of the amendment. Several major
academic institutions have submitted their respective proposed
Generally speaking, scholars share a highly
amendments.27
文) [Administrative Litigation Law Amendment Draft] (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/lfzt/2014/2013-12/31/content_1822188.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y6KC-4KP7]; The National People’s Congress of the People’s
Republic of China, Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiuzhengan (Caoan Erci Shenyi Gao)
Tiaowen (行政诉讼法修正案草案二次审议稿条文) [Administrative Litigation
Law
Amendment
Second
Draft]
(Sep.
1,
2014),
http://npc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0901/c14576-25580921.html
[https://perma.cc/2AXY-LKTG].
26
Yijing Jieshu de Zhengqiu Yijian (已经结束的征求意见) [Legislation Drafts
that Have Closed Up Soliciting Public Comments], THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S
CONGRESS
OF
THE
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flcazqyj/node_8195_2.htm [https://perma.cc/83HYEZ7B] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
27
Ma Huaide (马怀德), Sifa Gaige yu Xingzheng Susong Zhidu de Wanshan
(司法改革与行政诉讼制度的完善) [Judicial Reform and Perfection of the
Administrative Litigation System: Proposed Amendments to the Law and
Explanations], CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L. PRESS 126 (2004); Hu Jianmiao (胡建淼),
Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai Yanjiu (行政诉讼法修改研究) [Study on Revising
the Administrative Litigation Law: Proposed Articles and Reasons], ZHEJIANG U.
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consistent position: more judicial review and more effective dispute
resolution. However, legal scholars have been more influential for
technical issues than policy decisions.
As in the course of many other legislations, foreign laws
were frequently taken as a reference by Legislative Affairs
Commission officials and scholars.28 Foreign experts from the U.S.,
Germany, Japan and Taiwan were invited to Beijing several times
for consultation.
C. Three Deliberations
In accordance with the Legislation Law of the PRC, a
legislative bill shall in general be put to vote after three
deliberations at the sessions of the Standing Committee of the NPC.
If there is a consensus from various quarters, the bill shall be put to
vote after two deliberations, or even after one deliberation. The
Draft Amendment of the Law has undergone three deliberations,
which reflects legislators’ prudence. However, it took less than one
year for the Draft Amendment to be adopted on November 1, 2014.
For the amendment of an important law, that was faster than most
scholars had expected.
After three deliberations, the Draft Amendment was changed
PRESS 117 (2007); Yang Xiaojun (杨小君), XINGZHENG SUSONG FA WENTI
YANJIU YU ZHIDU GAIGE (行政诉讼法问题研究与制度改革) [Study on
Problems of the Administrative Litigation Law and Reform of the System]
(Chinese People’s Public Security Publishing House 2007); MO XIAOCHUAN (莫
于川), JIANSHE FAZHI ZHENGFU XUYAO SIFA GENG GEILI: XINGZHENG SUSONG FA
XIUGAI WENTI YANJIU JI ZHUANJIA JIANYI GAO (建设法治政府需要司法更给力:
行政诉讼法修改问题研究及专家建议稿) [More Effective Judicature Needed to
Build Rule of Law: Study on the Amending the Administrative Litigation Law
and Expert Proposals] (Tsinghua University Press 2014); He Haibo (何海波) et
al., , Lixiang de Xingzheng Susong Fa – Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng
Susong Fa Xuezhe Jianyi Gao (理想的行政诉讼法--《中华人民共和国行政诉
讼法》学者建议稿) [Ideal Administrative Litigation Law: Scholars’ Proposed
Draft of the Administrative Litigation Law], 2 ADMIN. L. REV. (2014).
28
A Chinese translation and compilation of foreign statutes with regard to
judicial review is on the way of publication. A COMPILATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LITIGATION LAW OF CHINA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES (He Haibo ed., The
Commercial Press) (forthcoming).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/7

[2018]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

159

in many places. This paper will not relate in detail the changes
made at each deliberation, but will give an overview of the content
changes. 29 This will help the readers understand the value of
repeated deliberations on a draft bill.
Generally speaking, the Legislative Affairs Commission has
done considerable research before drafting the bill and knows the
opinions of various quarters.
Thus, the Commission was
comparatively certain of the goals of the Amendment. Once the
Commission completed the Draft Bill, the basic framework of the
Amendment was therefore determined. Some scholars previously
proposed an “overall revision” from the litigation system and
mechanisms to the wording of the clauses and structure of the code.
Obviously, that proposal was not accepted. The Commission’s
Draft Bill is basically a “moderate revision.” Nonetheless, new
suggestions were constantly accepted at the deliberations and the
Draft Bill had been gradually improved.
After the first deliberation by the Standing Committee, the
Second Draft had several big changes. “Obviously improper” was
added to the basis of the judicial review, which gives the court a
better footing in exercising its reviewing power over administrative
discretion and a concrete reason to invalidate an unreasonable
29

For more relevant information, please refer to the explanations of all the
previous deliberations by the NPC Standing Committee. See generally Li Shishi
(李适时) , REPORT ON THE REVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW OF THE PRC (DRAFT) (关于中华人民共和国
行政诉讼法修正案草案修改情况的汇报),at the Tenth Plenary Session of the
12th Standing Committee of the NPC on Aug. 25, 2014; Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓阳),
REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE DELIBERATIONS ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW OF THE PRC (DRAFT) (关于中华人民共和国
行政诉讼法修正案草案审议结果的报告) , at the Eleventh Plenary Session of
the 12th Standing Committee of the NPC on Oct. 27, 2014 ; Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓
阳), REPORT ON THE OPINIONS ON DRAFT DECISION OF THE NPC STANDING
COMMITTEE ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW OF
THE PRC (《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改〈中华人民共和国行政
诉讼法〉的决定 (草案)》修改意见的汇报), at the Eleventh Plenary Session of
the 12th Standing Committee of the NPC on Oct. 31, 2014 (explaining several
opinions on the amendments to the Law).
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administrative act. The clause, “The Supreme People’s Court shall
refer to the State Council for ruling when [the court] thinks the
administrative rules are inconsistent,” was deleted.
The
reconsideration organ shall also become the defendant when it
sustains the administrative action in question. The Second Draft for
deliberation also made a minor adjustment to the structure—the
chapter with the most content, “Trial and Judgment,” was divided
into five sections, which made it seem better organized.
Some major revisions were made to the Draft Bill even at
the last deliberation. Social organizations that undertake public
administration and public service functions under authorization
were also included as the defendant of an administrative litigation.
Administrative contract was added to the scope of acceptable
lawsuit. It was emphasized that the court should disclose on its own
initiative legally effective judgments and rulings “for the public
access.” Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓阳), Chairman of the Law Committee
of the NPC, made a special explanation on these changes just one
day before the Draft Bill was put to vote.30
Some clauses in the Draft Bill have been repeatedly revised.
For instance, it was provided in the First Draft, “the Higher People’s
Court may determine a number of grassroots people’s courts’ crossadministrative-regional
jurisdiction
over
first
instance
administrative cases.” The Supreme People’s Court and others
pointed out that cross-administrative-regional jurisdiction over
administrative cases should not be limited to the grassroots courts
and the Draft Bill should leave some space for the jurisdiction
reform. Therefore, the word “grassroots” was deleted in the Third
Draft. The Supreme People’s Court then pointed out in accordance
with the message of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central
Committee of the CPC that cross-administrative-regional
jurisdiction would not be limited to the first instance cases. Thus,
the language “first instance” was deleted before the Draft Bill was
put to vote.
30

Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓阳), Oct. 31, 2014, supra note 30.
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There are also individual clauses that remained the same,
though they have undergone several proposed changes. The Law
provides that the court shall revoke any administrative action that
violates statutory procedures. In the First Draft of amendments, the
language was revised to “violates statutory procedures and may
have practical impact on the plaintiff’s right.” Some scholars
commented that this revision denied the independent value of
administrative procedure and turned out to be a regression of the
legislation on administrative procedure. In the Second Draft, the
language was revised as “violates statutory procedures and no
additions and corrections can be made.” Some scholars worried that
this would give too much leeway for agencies and as a result make
the requirements of statutory procedures meaningless. The Third
Draft accepted scholars’ opinions, removed the additional limit and
restored the original expression of the Law.
D. Passing
Under the Chinese legislative system, amendment of laws
may be conducted by the annual National People’s Congress which
consists of nearly 3,000 deputies or by the NPC Standing
Committee, which is much smaller in size and holds meetings more
frequently. It may appear to be more solemn when an amendment is
conducted by the NPC but the amendment will be equally powerful
in its legal effect. Moreover, the NPC’s sessions are relatively
shorter and address more matters. As a result, it is often difficult to
put legislative matters on the agenda. In practice, the vast majority
of law amendments have been conducted by the Standing
Committee and only four laws were amended by the NPC itself.31
31

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures (中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法) (promulgated by Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective July 8, 1979); Electoral Law of the
People’s Republic of China for the National People’s Congress and Local
People’s Congresses (中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表
大会选举法) (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective Jan.
1, 1980); Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民
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Thus, it is not strange at all that the amendment of the
Administrative Litigation Law was carried out by the Standing
Committee.
The Draft Bill was put to vote after three deliberations at the
session of the Standing Committee of the NPC. On November 1,
2014, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 12th Standing Committee
of the NPC adopted the decision on the Amendment of the
Administrative Litigation Law by 152 votes in favor, zero votes
against and five votes in abstention. Although the legislature is
comparatively easy to achieve consensus under the Chinese political
regime, it is also common to have negative votes. The result of zero
negative vote implied that the Amendment had been widely
recognized by the Standing Committee members who were mostly
former officials. This, for the staff of the legislature, was a huge
success.
III.

MAIN CONTENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LITIGATION LAW AMENDMENTS

After the 2014 amendments, the articles of the
Administrative Law increased from 75 to 103, out of which 45 are
revised, 33 are added, 5 are deleted, and only 25 of the original
provisions remained unchanged. The Amendment is a relatively big
revision if one judges purely on the language. But some clauses
have only incorporated the previous judicial interpretations of the
Supreme People’s Court, and some have been revised to make the
共和国刑事诉讼法) (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979,
effective January 1, 1980); Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (中
华人民共和国立法法) (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2015,
effective July 1, 2000). But several revisions of the above laws were also
conducted by the Standing Committee of the NPC. Many other major
amendments of important laws, such as The Organic Law of Local People’s
Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the PRC (中华人民共和国地方
各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法), The Criminal Law (中华人民
共和国刑法), and The Civil Procedure Law (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) were
all conducted by the Standing Committee.
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expression more precise or concise (e.g., abandon the concept of
“specific administrative action,” and use the wording
“administrative action”). What marks a major amendment of a law
is not how many provisions have been altered, but how much the
institution has been improved. Measured by the improvement of the
system, this Amendment signaled a remarkable progress, but there
are still considerable limitations.
A. Measures to Solve “Three Difficulties”
As the problems have been identified as “difficulty in getting
an administrative lawsuit registered, difficulty in adjudicating
administrative cases, and difficulty in executing court decisions,”
legislators’ attentions were drawn to these three aspects and their
efforts were concentrated in solving these difficulties.
1. Measures to Solve “Difficulty in Getting an Administrative
Lawsuit Registered”
The Amendment of the Law makes it a priority to solve the
difficulty in getting a case registered. It first sets it as a legal
principle to register a case according to law, requiring the court to
protect the right of a citizen to file a complaint and emphasizing that
agencies must not interfere with the court’s case acceptance. The
Amendment also adds a list of the types of actionable administrative
actions, declaring that several types of difficult administrative cases,
like land expropriation decisions, shall fall into the scope of case
acceptance of administrative litigation.
Thirdly and most
importantly, the pre-registration complaint examination is revised as
complaint registration. When the court “is unable to determine on
the spot whether a complaint meets the conditions for filing a
complaint as set out by the present law, the court shall receive the
complaint, issue a written certification bearing the date of receipt,
and decide whether to register the complaint within seven days.” 32
Lastly, remedies are set out for plaintiffs when their complaints are
32

Article 51.
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rejected. When the court refuses to register a complaint, the
plaintiff may either appeal the rejection or file his complaint with
the court at a higher level; if the court rejects the complaint
materials and gives no written certification, the judge directly in
charge and other persons directly responsible shall be disciplined.
With regard to lawsuit registration, the Amendment sets out the
guideline, the rule and the guarantee. Its tough tone and severe
measures are unprecedented in Chinese law.
2. Measures to Solve “Difficulty in Adjudicating
Administrative Cases”
In order to solve the difficulty in adjudicating administrative
cases, the Amendment has adopted a number of measures.
It has first strengthened procedural safeguards. The agency
leader is required in principle to appear in court, or at least an
employee should appear in court; if the leader or an employee of the
agency refuses to appear in court or if an agency uses illegal means
such as deceiving or coercing the plaintiff to withdraw his
complaint, the agency shall be subject to appropriate punishment.
In the course of a litigation, if the court deems that the execution of
an administrative action will impair state and public interest or will
cause irreparable damage to the parties, the court shall rule to
suspend the execution of the administrative action under challenge.
The time limit for trial of administrative cases has been extended to
six months for first instance of trail and three months for second
instance (originally, three months and two months) and summary
procedures have been added so as to relieve judges’ caseloads.
In the second place, the court is equipped with more
powerful means of examination. If an administrative action is
“obviously improper,” the court shall rule to revoke it. Previously,
the court may only exercise very limited review of administrative
discretion. An administrative action that just violates statutory
procedure slightly and does not cause any actual impact to the
plaintiff’s right shall also be deemed illegal. When the court deems
a normative document (a legal document that is not a piece of
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formal legislation but has universal binding force), on the basis of
which the administrative action under challenge is taken is illegal,
the court shall not take the normative document as a legal basis for
determining the legality of the administrative action in question.
This point has also been clarified.
Thirdly, court decisions can be more flexible and diverse.
Besides revoking illegal administrative actions, the court may also
declare administrative actions illegal and order the agency to modify
its action or to perform what it should do. If the revocation of an
administrative action that should be revoked may cause significant
detriment to state and/or public interest, the court shall refrain from
revocation and instead declare the administrative action illegal and
order the agency to take remedial measures. If an administrative
action seriously and evidently violates the law, for instance, and the
action is not taken by a competent administrative institution, the
court shall declare the administrative action void. In addition to
inappropriate administrative punishment, other administrative
actions involving erroneous determination of the amount of money
can cause the court to directly enter a judgment to modify the
administrative actions. The scope of mediation by the court is
largely extended: the court may conduct mediation in all cases
involving administrative discretion, and conclude the cases with
mediation agreements. Prior to the Amendment, judges could only
persuade the plaintiff to withdraw to achieve reconciliation.
Fourthly, with regard to a case that is tossed back and forth,
the Amendment makes special provisions for the purpose of closing
the case and settling the dispute. When the cases involve
administrative licensing, registration, expropriation, or agency’s
decision on civil disputes, the court shall, under the parties’
application for collectively resolving relevant civil disputes,
adjudicate them together. When a remanded case has been reheard
by the trial court but a party appeals the decision, the court of
second instance shall enter a judgment by itself and must not
remand the case to the trial court for retrial a second time.
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3. Measures to Solve “Difficulty in Executing Court Decisions”
To solving the difficulty to execute court decisions, the
Amendment also makes a fierce prescription. At first, for any
agency that should make the payment but does not perform it, the
court shall inform the bank to transfer the money from the agency’s
bank account. Before this Amendment, the Law did not mention
compensation. Second, if an agency fails to perform its duties
within the prescribed time limit, the agency leader shall be imposed
a fine of 50-100 yuan a day. Before this Amendment, the court may
only impose a fine on the agency. This revision is more
accommodating in theory and will be more viable in practice.
Third, if an agency refuses to perform the court’s judgment, ruling
or mediation agreement, resulting in adverse impact in society, the
court shall deem the agency’s executive staff and other staff directly
liable; if the circumstances are serious enough to constitute a crime,
the court shall transfer the case to the people’s procuratorate for
prosecution. This provision conveys a very clear message:
administrative officials must take the court decision seriously.
When the Amendment of the Law was promulgated, a newspaper
created a banner headline to discuss this provision.33 Fourth, the
court may make a public announcement on an agency’s refusal to
enforce the court decision and put forward judicial
recommendations to relevant departments. This seemingly mild
approach is probably more helpful under the Chinese system in
urging agencies to perform their obligations. Overall, it should be
uncommon that an agency shall avowedly refuses to perform a court
decision in the future.
B. Provisions with Chinese Characteristics
Legislators have also established, in the course of amending
the Law, some rules with strong Chinese characteristics to
33

Sun Qian (孙乾), Xingzheng Jiguan Bulvxing Panjue Ke Ju Fuzeren (行政机
关拒不履行判决可拘负责人) [Responsible Official Shall be Detained if
Administrative Organ Refuses to Perform Court Decision], SOHUNEWS (NOV. 2,
2014) [https://perma.cc/HD96-883T].
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accommodate the current Chinese political system and social
perceptions. First of all, the leader of an agency is required to
appear in court. Secondly, reconsideration organ is demanded to be
the defendant. These rules are controversial even in China. The
practical effects of these practices remain to be seen.
1. The Leader of an Agency Appears in Court
Long before the Law was amended, the practice that the
leader of an agency appears in court was already the norm in some
areas. A State Council’s document has included it as a measure to
“strengthen the construction of a government ruled by law.”34
Those who favor this provision believe that the agency leader
appearing in court will help ease the antagonism between the two
parties in the litigation, settle the administrative dispute
appropriately, enhance the agency leader’s sense to conduct
administration in accordance with law, and identify and solve the
problems of administrative enforcement of law. In a certain sense,
this practice also symbolizes agencies’ respect for the judiciary and
for the rule of law. Opponents argue that agency leader appearing in
court is a mere formality, does not solve practical problems and may
even cause unnecessary stress and troubles to the court. 35
The Second Draft once provided that “the leader of the
defendant agency should appear in court. If the leader cannot
34

Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe de Yijian (国务院关于
加强法治政府建设的意见) [Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the
Construction of Government Ruled by Law] (promulgated by the St. Council,
Oct. 10, 2010, effective Oct. 10, 2010).
35
See Lv Shang Min (吕尚敏), Xingzhengshouzhang Yingdang Chuting Yingsu
ma?Zai Sifa de Jishu, Quanneng Yu Gongneng Zhijian (行政首长应当出庭应诉
吗？在司法的技术、权能与功能之间), [Should the Chief Executive Appear in
Court? In Between the Judicial Technology, Power and Function], 17 ADMIN. L.
REV. 98 (2009) (discussing the ramification of administrative organ’s chief
officials appearing in court); Zhang Zhi Yuan (章志远), Xingzheng Susong Zhong
de Xingzheng Shouzhang Chuting Yingsu Zhidu Yanjiu (行政诉讼中的行政首长
出庭应诉制度研究), [Study on the Rule of Chief Executive Appearing in Court
in Administrative Litigations] 34 L. SCI. MAG. 94 (2013) (discussing the rules
and procedures of administrative organ’s chief officials appearing in court).
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appear in court, he or she may also entrust an appropriate employee
to appear in court.” Some NPC deputies were not satisfied, arguing
that the language of the draft providing that the leader “may also
entrust” other employees to appear in court does not have binding
force to the agency leader. In the last deliberation, the language
“may also” was then changed to “should.” Thus, after some
revision, article 3.3 reads “the leader of an agency against which the
complaint is filed shall appear in court to respond to the complaint.
If the leader is unable to appear in court, a relevant employee of the
agency shall appear in court.”
In Chinese law, “agency leader” includes the agency head
and deputy head of the agency. The provision “shall appear in court
to respond to the complaint” looks more like a manifesto. This
provision, in practice, needs to rely on the internal regulation and
evaluation of the agency for enforcement. Whether the leader of an
agency shall appear in court depends to a large extent on the work
schedules and caseloads of the agency. The court may advise the
leader of an agency to appear in court in particular cases, but
generally speaking the court shall not force the agency leader to
appear in court, demand an agency to explain why its leader is
unable to appear in court, or investigate whether the reasons are
tenable. In short, an agency must entrust a relevant employee,
instead of merely entrusting an attorney outside the agency, to
appear in court when its leader is unable to appear in court. The
amended law also allows, in addition to the agency leader appearing
in court, an agency to entrust one or two legal representatives to
appear in court at the same time.
On April 11, 2016, almost one year after the amended Law
came into effect, Chen Minming (陈鸣明), vice-governor of
Guizhou Province appeared in a court session. Minming became the
first high official appearing in court to defend an agency action in
the Chinese history of administrative litigation. This case was
widely covered by the media.36
36

Jia Shi Yu (贾世煜), Fu Shengzhang Chuting Yingsu “Min Gao Guan”
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2. Reconsideration Organ Demanded to be the Defendant
This provision may be the most controversial provision in
this Amendment. Yet it also has the most remarkable and farreaching impact.
In addition to administrative litigation, there are various internal
relief channels in the Chinese administrative system. A party may,
in principle, apply to the agency of the next higher level for
reconsideration if he or she disagrees with the decision made by an
agency. If the decision is made by a department of a local
government, the party may apply to the local government for
reconsideration. The Legal Affairs Office of a reconsideration organ
is the one that undertakes the duty of reconsideration, even though
the decision is made in the name of the reconsideration organ. A
party may, in general, file a case to the court if he or she does not
accept the decision after reconsideration.
In theory, administrative reconsideration should become the
main channel of solving administrative disputes due to its simple
procedure and low cost. However, in reality, this channel has
achieved suboptimal effect. First of all, reconsideration organs have
only handled a small number of cases, the number being even
smaller than that of litigation cases. Administrative reconsideration
cases would be even fewer but for the provisions of some laws or
regulations that there must be reconsideration before administrative
litigation. Moreover, the percentage of reconsideration decisions in
favor of the applicants (including revocation, modification, ordered
performance or confirmed illegality of administrative action) has
dropped from thirty percent, before the enforcement of the
Administrative Reconsideration Law, to less than ten percent in
recent years.37 On the other hand, the percentage in favor of
Qianhou (副省长出庭应诉“民告官”前后) [Before and After the ViceGovernor Appearing in Court] BEIJING NEWS (April 18, 2016),
http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2016/04/18/400436.html
[https://perma.cc/7R2A-65BU].
37
The statistic here and the ones on administrative reconsideration below
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agencies has increased to a sustained value of sixty percent.
Reconsideration organs thus received the notorious nickname of
“sustaining agency.” The low percentage of reconsideration
decisions in favor of the applicants in turn dampened the people’s
confidence in the system’s effectiveness and hindered them from
seeking reconsideration.
There are many reasons for the insufficient effects of
administrative reconsideration, but one provision of the Law can
hardly absolve itself from the blame. According to that provision,
which agency shall be the defendant when an applicant does not
accept the reconsideration decision and files in the court depends on
the reconsideration organ’s decision on the dispute. Should it
decide to sustain the original administrative action, the
reconsideration organ shall not be the defendant. On the other hand,
when it decides to modify the original administrative action, it shall
be the defendant.
In practice, a reconsideration organ that decides to modify the
original administrative action often falls between two stools because
it will not only offend its counterpart that has decided the
administrative action, but also poke up the third party and act as the
defendant. Being the defendant will incur a substantial cost and, in
the current official evaluation system, a risk of demerits in the
evaluation.
Hence, reconsideration organs try to sustain
administration actions to avoid troubles. The unusually high
proportion of reconsideration decisions that sustain the original
administrative actions can be attributed as an effect of the aforesaid
provision.
There are two ways to get rid of this predicaments: one is to
stipulate that no reconsideration organ shall be a defendant, and the
other is to stipulate that all reconsideration organs shall be named as
defendants.
Those who argue for the former state that
reconsideration organs are the presiding judges over the dispute, and
have been provided by the State Council Legal Affairs Office. See
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/col/col28/index.html.
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it is a common practice across nations that a judge cannot be a
defendant. Once they are required to be defendants, reconsideration
organs will have a great burden of court appearance, and disputes
will not be effectively solved in the end. Those who argue
otherwise state that administrative reconsideration is an internal
procedure for supervision and error correction within the
administrative system, and as part of the administrative system, the
reconsideration organ should assume administrative responsibilities.
In the Chinese system, is making reconsideration organs defendants
the only way to compel them to take on responsibilities? Scholars
are divided. Government legal affairs departments unanimously
oppose the idea of making reconsideration organs defendants, while
the masses and NPC deputies scream for making reconsideration
organs defendants, and courts also believe that making
reconsideration organs defendants will help settle disputes.
The Amendment of the Law made a decision on this issue
that a reconsideration organ shall be defendant regardless of
whether it decides to sustain or modify the original administrative
actions. The Amendment stipulates that the reconsideration organ
and the agency of the original administrative action shall be codefendants if a reconsideration organ decides to sustain the original
administrative action. The design of this rule has caused many
complex technical problems, including but not limited to court
jurisdiction, defendant’s response, and way of judgment. The effect
of implementation shall be discussed afterwards.
C. Unachieved Proposals for Amendment
Although the legislature has made a lot of efforts many
problems remain unresolved, much to the disappointment of some
judges, scholars and the public. These unfinished tasks include
expanding the scope of actionable cases, establishing public interest
litigation, defining review power over regulations, and adjusting the
judicial system. The general goal of the legislature is to solve the
most pressing problems of administrative trials instead of simply
expanding the function of administrative litigation in state
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governance.
1. Rather Limited Expansion of Actionable Cases
The Amendment has made some efforts to expand the scope
of administrative cases. Firstly, it has added several types of
actionable cases to the original eight stipulations, expanding the
scope to twelve stipulations. One breakthrough is to bring agency’s
contract action into the scope of administrative cases. Secondly, as
the fallback provision of the circumstances listed above indicates,
the rights to be protected have been expanded from personal right
and property right to other lawful rights and interests. Thirdly, the
administrative actions taken by an organization that is empowered
by law, regulation or rule has also been brought, by way of
describing the concept of administrative actions, into the adjustment
scope of law and scope of actionable cases by the court. These
stipulations have provided space for future extension of the scope of
administrative litigation.
However, provisions on the scope of cases still follow the
mode originally listed and the clause concerning the cases that the
court shall not accept remains untouched. Firstly, the agency’s
normative documents remain outside the scope of actionable cases.
Courts can only indirectly review related normative documents,
while reviewing the legality of specific administrative actions.
Courts may rule in a particular case that the related normative
document does not apply but may not declare it unlawful and void.
Secondly, the justiciability of management actions such as
recruitment, dismissal, and discharge of civil servants are not
affirmed. Thus, civil servant management cases are still exempt
from lawsuits. Thirdly, the justiciability of some new types of rights
such as the right to work, the right to education and the right to a
healthy environment remains to be interpreted. Compared with the
original judicial interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court, the
scope of actionable cases of administrative litigation is not
substantially expanded in the aspect of legal norms.
All the above shows that the principle of rule of law that “all
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legal disputes may be settled at court” has not been recognized. In
reality, the statement on administrative litigation in the decision of
the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee also
places more emphasis on the solution of “difficulties in getting an
administrative lawsuit registered, adjudicating administrative cases,
and executing court decisions,” instead of fully acknowledging the
importance of administrative litigation in a government ruled by
law. The public still cannot expect much from the administrative
litigation function.
2. Public Interest Administrative Litigation Still Missing
Public interest administrative litigation should have been an
extension of the functions to facilitate administrative litigation,
helping to supervise agencies, maintain the public law and order,
and transform administrative litigation into a public forum for
promoting institutional changes. The academics have vigorously
called for public interest efforts in administrative litigation. Some
scholars have suggested, albeit in vain, that social organizations be
the ones to initiate public interest administrative litigations. On the
one hand, social organizations in China are still underdeveloped.
On the other hand, the authorities have reservations about many
social organizations and thus are doubtful about social
organizations’ involvement in public interest litigation.
The Eighteenth CPC Central Committee mentioned in its
decision adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session, “exploring the
establishment of a public interest litigation system where the
people’s procuratorate initiates the legal proceedings.”38 Although
the procuratorate have great enthusiasm for this, the Government
Legal Affairs Department expressly opposes the suggestion that the
procuratorate acts as the plaintiff of administrative cases. The Legal
Affairs Office of the State Council points out that an agency itself is
the representative of public interest. Thus, it does not conform to
the traditional system where the procuratorate initiates legal
38

Supra note 23.
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proceedings against an agency in the court.39 Some scholars are
also concerned about the actual effect of the procuratorate’s
initiation of public interest litigations. The current procuratorates of
China, like the court, do not enjoy a guaranteed independence to
exercise their power. Even if the law empowers them to initiate
public interest litigations, the procuratorates may not be able to
initiate more than a few in years. They will not be able to help
much to establish a system as such. Because there were too many
differences on this issue, the Amendment did not endorse this
suggestion and the problem is left for “further exploration” in
practice.40
3. The Power of Regulation Review Remains to be Defined
The legal system of China is highly complicated, which
frustrates even domestic legal scholars and attorneys, not to mention
foreign observers. In simple terms, the National People’s Congress
and its Standing Committee may enact laws, the State Council may
enact administrative regulations, local People’s Congress and its
Standing Committee of relatively higher status may enact local
regulations, and State Council departments and local governments
of relatively higher status may enact administrative rules. Among
these forms, the force of laws is higher than that of administrative
and local regulations, and the force of administrative and local
regulations is, roughly speaking, higher than that of rules. It is
completely out of the question in China for courts to review the
constitutionality of laws, while it has been legally affirmed that
courts have the power to review collaterally the legality of rules and
determine their application. At present, a difficult problem is the
39

Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓阳), Oct. 31, 2014, supra note 30.
On May 1, 2015, after the Administrative Litigation Law Amendment was
promulgated, the Standing Committee of the NPC authorized the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate to conduct a two-year Public Interest Litigation Pilot
Program in the fields of ecological environment, resources preservation, stateowned assets protection, assignment of the right to the use of state-owned land
and food and drug safety. Up to September 2016, the pilot Procuratorates filed 28
litigations of such sort in total.
40
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inconsistency between regulations (especially local regulations) and
laws. The law has not explicitly provided whether a court may
exclude directly the application of inconsistent local regulations. A
judge once declared in the court decision that a provision of a local
regulation was inconsistent with the law and should not apply, but
that caused herself a lot of trouble.41 Along with the continuous
delegation of legislative power, 282 cities nationwide with
subordinate districts will be delegated the power to enact local
regulations,42 which makes it more urgent for the judicial body to
review local regulations.
However, there are different opinions on this issue. The
majority of scholars propose that the courts should have the power
to independently decide on the application of a local regulation in
adjudicating individual cases. The opposite opinion is that under
the Chinese system of the People’s Congress courts are accountable
to the People’s Congress at the same level, by which judges are
appointed and to which the court presidents shall report. Therefore,
courts cannot exclude on their own the application of a local
regulation. If in adjudication courts have any doubt about the
legality of a local regulation, they may suspend the adjudication and
refer it to a competent organ for judgment according to relevant
provisions. The Amendment evaded this controversy and inherited
the original stipulation, that is, courts must “base” their judgment on
the law, administrative regulation and local regulation.
41

Wang Hong (王宏), Fayuan Qike Feiyi Renda Fagui (法院岂可非议人大法
规：甘肃高院撤销酒泉中院一起错误判决) [How Could a Court Reproach the
Regulation Enacted by the People’s Congress: Gansu Provincial Higher People’s
Court Reversed the Wrong Decision by Jiuquan People’s Court], BEIJING YOUTH
DAILY, Oct. 27, 2000; Tian Yi (田毅) & Wang Ying (王颖), Yige Faguan De
Mingyun Yu Fatiao Dichu Zhi Bian (一个法官的命运与“法条抵触之辩) [A
Judge’s Fate and “Debate on the Conflict of Legal Provisions”], 21st CENTURY
ECON. REP., (Nov.17, 2003).
42
Chen Liping (陈丽平)，Difang Lifa Quan Kuozhi 282 Ge Shequ De Shi (地
方立法权扩至282个设区的市)[282 Cities that are Divided into Districts to be
Delegated Law-making Power], FAZHI RIBAO [Legal Daily], (Aug.26, 2014),
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zt/content/201408/26/content_5733453.htm?node=71314 [https://perma.cc/Y6HJ-WXAU].
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Controversies over this issue may still occur in the future.
4. Partial Adjustment to Administrative Adjudication System
Compared to the above improvement on administrative
adjudication mechanisms, the reform on administrative adjudication
system is probably of more decisive significance. Administrative
adjudication system decides what kind of judiciary shall adjudicate
administrative cases. Many people deemed it a top priority when
amending the Law. If the provision on this issue is not properly
amended and judges do not have independence and authority, the
Amendment of the Law will achieve a fraction of its intended
effects, and some clauses will become mere decorations.
In the course of amending the Law, there have been various
proposals, including one of establishing within the current court
system administrative courts to specifically adjudicate
administrative cases.43 The legislation finally retained the current
system that there is an administrative division in people’s courts at
all four levels but made a lot of minor adjustments. The final
revision combined various proposals. The first is hierarchical
jurisdiction. This proposal says that any complaint brought against
a county government shall be referred to the intermediate people’s
43

See generally Jiang Bixin (江必新), Zhongguo Xingzheng Shenpan Tizhi
Gaige Yanjiu - Jianlun Woguo Xingzheng Fayuan Tixi Goujian De Jichu Yiju Ji
Gouxiang (中国行政审判体制改革研究——兼论我国行政法院体系构建的基
础、依据及构想)[Research on China’s Administrative Adjudication System
Reform — Currently on Foundation, Basis and Conception of China’s
Administrative Court System Construction], 4 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU
[Administrative Law Review] 3 (2013) (explaining the proposed changes to the
court systems); Ma Huaide (马怀德), Xingzheng Shenpan Tizhi Gaige De
Mubiao: Sheli Xingzheng Fayuan (行政审判体制改革的目标：设立行政法院)
[The Aim of Administrative Adjudication System Reform Is to Establish
Administrative Court], 7 FALV SHIYONG [Journal of Law Application] 8 (2013)
(describing the projected benefits to the amendments to the court system through
administrative changes); He Haibo (何海波), Xingzheng Shenpan Tizhi Gaige
Chuyi (行政审判体制改革刍议) [On Reform of Administrative Adjudication
System], 1 ZHONGGUO FALV PINGLUN [China Law Review] 63 (2014) (detailing
the reforms of the administrative adjudication system, and the impacts of these
decisions).
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court. A superior court may also hear a case under the lower court’s
jurisdiction, but the superior court is forbidden to send a case in its
jurisdiction to a lower court. Then, a lower court may refer a case
under its jurisdiction to a superior court for designating another
court to hear the case. This leaves open the possibility of crossregional jurisdiction. Finally, the higher people’s court under the
approval of the Supreme People’s Court may determine a number of
courts to exercise cross-regional administrative jurisdiction over
administrative cases.
This provides a basis for centralized
jurisdiction and also leaves open the possibility of establishing
special administrative courts.
The above provisions reflect the spirit of the Fourth Plenary
Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee of moderate adjustment
of the administrative lawsuit jurisdiction system. It helps enhance
the anti-interference capacity of administrative adjudication.
However, because legislators have not made decisions on the
judicial system, there is still much uncertainties left in terms of
specific plan and many issues remain to be further explored in
practice. The overall advancement of judicial reform measures such
as centralized management of the personnel, finance and materials
of courts below the provincial level will also influence the trend of
the reform of administrative adjudication system.
IV.

PRELIMINARY EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENT

It has been more than two years since the amended
Administrative Litigation Law came into effect in May 2015. Now,
we can make a preliminary evaluation on the effect of the
Amendment.
There are different perspectives on the effects of the
amended Administrative Litigation Law. From the perspective of
institutional improvement, I would like to list three indicators: (1)
whether the amended law can effectively solve the difficulty in
getting an administrative lawsuit registered and make administrative
cases increase by a large margin, (2) whether it can effectively solve
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the difficulty in winning an administrative case and make the
plaintiff’s winning rate rise significantly, and (3) whether it can
improve the relevant mechanism of administrative dispute
resolution and make administrative reconsideration cases increase
and petition cases decrease.44
Statistics by the Supreme People’s Court, the Legal Affairs
Office of the State Council and the State Bureau for Letters and
Visits on the situation of administrative litigation, administrative
reconsideration and petitions nationwide in 2015 and 2016 provide
an answer to the above questions. It should be noted that the new
Administrative Litigation Law has not been in effect long enough to
fully reveal the effect of the new Law. Nevertheless, the statistics
can give us an idea of the effect.
A. Administrative Cases Increased by a Large Margin, and
“Difficulty in Getting an Administrative Lawsuit
Registered” Greatly Alleviated
There were 220,398 pieces of first instance administrative
cases in 2015, an increase of fifty-five percent compared to 2014
and the number leveled off at 225,485 in 2016. This is the biggest
increase following the overall implementation of the Administrative
Litigation Law in early 1990s. Because the scope of actionable
cases has not been largely extended in this Amendment, which had
limited influence on the increase of cases accepted, the increase in
the number has obviously resulted from the implementation of the
registration system. According to report, in the month the
registration system was first implemented, first instance
administrative cases that were accepted nationwide attained a
growth of 221 percent compared with the same period of the
previous year, and 90 percent complaints were registered on the
44

He Haibo (何海波), Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai Zhihou De Xuannian
(《行政诉讼法》修改之后的悬念) [Suspense after the Administrative Litigation
Law Amendment], 12 CHINA REFORM, (2014).
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spot.45 Although court’s refusal to register a case or issue a ruling is
still heard occasionally, the difficulty in getting an administrative
case registered has been greatly alleviated. In the meantime, the
case number of second instance continuously increased to more than
ten thousand in 2016, an all time high in its history.
The surge of administrative cases in quantity will provide
new opportunities for lawyers. Trial lawyers of administrative
litigation (including government lawyers) are at the threshold of a
new period in development. However, it has brought tremendous
pressure to courts’ adjudication and administrative response in the
short term. From January to September 2016, the Supreme People’s
Court received more than 2,000 new administrative cases, which is
unprecedented.46 The cases suing the State Administration of
Taxation and the Housing and Construction Department exceeded
500 respectively. The legislative affairs officers of the departments
of the State Council are busying flying around the county to respond
to lawsuits. Because it is difficult to immediately recruit in-staff
personnel, the judges and government legal staff in position
suddenly faced a greatly increased burden.
Figure 1: Number of Administrative Cases Accepted and Heard over
the Years
45

Luo Shuzhen (罗书臻), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Tongbao Shishi Li’an
Dengji Zhi Gaige Shouyue: Qingkuang Li’an Shu Chao Baiwan, Dangchang
Li’an Lv Da 9 Cheng (最高人民法院通报实施立案登记制改革首月情况：立
案数超百万，当场立案率达９成) [The Supreme People’s Court Announced
the First-month Implementation of the Amended Case Registration System:
Number of Cases Registered Reached over a Million and 90% Registered on the
Spot], RENMIN FAYUANBAO [People’s Court Daily] (Jun. 10, 2015),
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Zhang Wei (张维), Zuigao Fa Shouli Hang Su An Jinnian Jiang Chao
Sanqian Jian (最高法受理行诉案今年将超三千件) [The Supreme People’s
Court Will Accept and Hear More Than 3000 Pieces of Administrative Cases This
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RIBAO
[Legal
Daily]
(Oct.
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2016),
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It is not clear how many disputes and what disputes should
have been settled in courts but failed to enter court proceedings. It
is not entirely clear at present what administrative management
areas the newly accepted cases mainly concern and what the
administrative actions in questions are. These issues require
specific research. The statistics over the years show that public
security cases once occupied the first place but declined later to the
third place. Cases involving urban construction and natural
resources have been the two most prevalent types of lawsuits for ten
years consecutively, accounting for around 30 percent of the total
number (see Fig. 2). House demolition and land expropriation have
become social disputes of great contention. The courts are actively
engaged in settling the hot disputes.
Figure 2: Proportion of Administrative Lawsuits in Several Major
Areas of Administrative Management
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Among the types of administrative actions, administrative
penalty is still the first category, but the proportion of cases
involving administrative penalty has been declining continuously in
recent years and dropped to below nine percent in 2016. It is worth
noting that several types of traditional administrative actions
(including administrative penalty, administrative licensing,
administrative adjudication, administrative coercive measures,
administrative inaction, administrative compensation) altogether
account for less than thirty percent (see Figure 3). It is worth
studying what the “other” cases refer to.
Figure 3: Proportion of Administrative Lawsuits Involving Several
Major Types of Administrative Actions
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The Case Registration System has brought some new
problems while solving the difficulty in getting an administrative
lawsuit registered. A small number of citizens filed a large number
of complaints, which included many trivial, repetitive, and
practically meaningless ones. For instance, a party filed, in order to
get more compensation for house demolition, hundreds of
complaints on government information disclosure to force the
government to participate in negotiation. We cannot identify the
proportion of litigation abuse from the statistics, but many courts are
deeply bothered by it. These lawsuits have taken up too much of the
judicial resources while unable to solve practical problems. Courts
have begun to limit such lawsuits, and their initiative has been
recognized by the Supreme People’s Court.47
47
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初字第21号) ; Wang Xiaoyan (王小燕), Nantong Gangzha Fayuan Shuaixian
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息公开滥诉行为) [Gangzha People’s Court of Nantong City Takes the Lead in
Regulating Abuse Action on Government Information Disclosure], Jiangsu
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People’s
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http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/art/2015/02/27/23_88908.html; Lu Hongxia Su Nantong
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B. Plaintiff Winning Rate Rose Slightly, but “Difficulty in
Adjudicating Administrative Cases” Still to Be Improved
The implementation of Case Registration System has
brought the difficult task of solving administrative disputes into the
courtroom. How the court will deal with the incoming disputes is
the biggest suspense. In the past, courts usually persuaded plaintiffs
to withdraw or flatly rejected complaints due to the excessive
caseloads. Meanwhile, plaintiff’s winning rates sometimes declined
rather than rose. In this regard, courts have done well in the past
year.
Plaintiffs’ withdrawal rate has dropped sharply. Plaintiff
withdrawals used to be the most common way to close cases,
exceeding even court judgments. Plaintiffs’ withdrawal rate
experienced two radical changes in the past thirty years, and the
highest was respectively fifty-seven percent in 1997, and fifty
percent in 2012; accordingly, cases that were closed in ways other
than court judgments reached more than seventy percent at one
time. The high withdrawal rate reflects courts’ difficulty in
adjudicating administrative cases. Along with the adjustment of
judicial policy, plaintiffs’ withdrawal rate kept declining in the last
three years, and even reached twenty percent in 2016, the lowest
since the implementation of the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law
(see Figure 4). Moreover, the rate of plaintiffs’ withdrawal after the
defendant agency modified the administrative action in question,
which may be regarded as if the plaintiff actually won the case, has
also risen somewhat (see Figure 5).
Figure 4 Proportion of Non-decision including Plaintiff Withdrawal,
Dismissal and Transferal

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

184

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 13]
Withdraw
dismiss
Transfer

70

Percentage（％）

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05

07

09

11

13

15

Year

Figure 5: Proportion of Plaintiff Withdrawal after the Defendant
Agency Modifies the Alleged Administrative Action
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Next, the rate that the court finds in favor of the plaintiff has
risen slightly.
In the present actual context of Chinese
administrative law enforcement and judicial review, the plaintiff
winning rate is a valid index of fair trial according to law by the
court. The rate that the court finds in favor of the plaintiff has once
reached twenty-four percent in history, but it declined afterwards.
The judicial system implemented “grand mediation” a few years
ago, and the plaintiff winning rate once dropped to less than eight
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percent. It has risen slightly in the recent two years, and reached
13.4 percent in 2016 (see Figure 6). This indicates that the amended
Administrative Litigation Law has played a positive role in
protecting citizens’ rights. We are not sure, however, how many
plaintiffs out of plaintiff’s winning cases have received substantive
relief, and whether those disputes have been solved meaningfully.
Even on the surface of the cases, there is still room for the plaintiff
winning rate to rise further in the future, referring to the
aforementioned experience of Zhejiang Taizhou and Henan
Province.
Figure 6: Proportion of First Instance Case Decisions in Favor of
Plaintiff and Defendant
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In addition, the proportion of court decisions to dismiss the
lawsuit without a ruling on substantial issue has increased
significantly, accounting for twenty-two percent of all cases closed
in 2016 (see Figure 4). It is not surprising that the proportion of
courts’ rulings to dismiss the lawsuit after registration increased,
taking into account that the court has lowered the threshold for
accepting a case after the implementation of the Case Registration
System and many cases that did not meet the conditions for lawsuit
filing have been accepted. Compared to the proportion of courts’
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decisions to reject the complaint, the proportion of court rulings to
dismiss the lawsuit is still higher. Courts only ruled to reject 10,343
complaints in 2016, which was equal to one-fifth of the cases
dismissed after acceptance. It is necessary for the court to improve
case registration in the future and rule to reject complaints at the
very beginning that obviously do not meet the conditions for
acceptance, including complaints that clearly indicate litigation
abuse. Rejection at the very beginning is more cost-efficient than
dismissal afterwards. The public needs to accept the fact that the
Case Registration System does not need to accept all complaints.
C. Administrative Reconsideration Achieves Better Effect but
the “Main Chanel” Role has not been Brought into Full Play
Administrative dispute settlement is a big category and
dispute
settlement
mechanisms—administrative
litigation,
administrative reconsideration and petition—should be reasonably
allocated. Administrative reconsideration should, for reasons of
simplicity, speed, and cost, accept and solve in theory the majority
of administrative disputes and become the main channel of
administrative dispute settlement. For the reason of its strictness
and authority in fact-finding, law application, and implementation
procedure, administrative litigation should become the last relief.
Petition, an informal and complementary channel of dispute
settlement, should be limited to a small number of administrative
disputes. An ideal ratio of administrative reconsideration to
administrative litigation to petition should be, roughly speaking,
100:10:1; but it has been quite the opposite in reality.
The poor effect of administrative reconsideration mainly
attributes to its system, but as aforementioned, the following
provision of the Law was also problematic: if the reconsideration
organ decides to sustain the original administrative action, the party
concerned may only sue the original agency that has taken the
administrative action in question. If the reconsideration organ
decides to modify the original administrative action, the
reconsideration organ shall be the defendant. Then, the amended
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Administrative Litigation Law will provide whether the
reconsideration organ should decide to sustain or modify the
original administrative action, in which the reconsideration organ
would be the defendant. There has been much controversy over the
above provision in the academic circle.
The statistics of the year 2015 and 2016 show positive
responses to the above provision by the reconsideration organ. At
first, the long-term increase of reconsideration decision to sustain
the original administrative action, including dismissal of application
for administrative reconsideration, stopped and visibly declined for
the first time. In addition, the number of reconsideration decisions
in favor of applicants stopped declining over the years, attained 16.8
percent in 2016, which was the highest in a decade, doubling that of
the year prior to the amendment (see Figure 7). In the meantime,
administrative reconsideration cases continued to grow, reaching
close to 164,000 pieces in 2016 (see Figure 8). The provision that
the reconsideration organ shall be the defendant has promoted the
conscientious fulfillment of its reconsideration duties and the duties
to protect of citizens’ rights. It may also induce future reform of the
administrative reconsideration system and amendment of the
Administrative Reconsideration Law. It will take some time to see
what the effects will be.
Figure 7: Closure of Administrative Reconsideration Cases
Nationwide Over the Years
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While
administrative
litigation
and
administrative
reconsideration increased, the number of petitions declined.
Statistics from the State Bureau for Letters and Visits show that
petitions nationwide declined by 7.4 percent in 2015, petitions in the
city of Beijing declined by 6.5 percent, and the number of collective
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petitions also declined.48 In 2016, petitions nationwide declined
again, slightly but steadily.49 We cannot simply attribute the decline
of petitions to the improvement of administrative litigation and
administrative reconsideration systems. However, considering that
the vast majority of petitioned matters relate to agencies, the
unimpeded channels mentioned above have indeed played a role in
the decrease in petitions.
V.

CONCLUSION
The 2014 Amendment of the Administrative Litigation Law
has made a powerful response to the difficulties in getting an
administrative lawsuit registered, adjudicating administrative cases
and executing court decisions. After the amended Administrative
Litigation Law came into effect, the acceptance of first instance
administrative lawsuits increased sharply, and the plaintiffs’ winning
rate also rose in the same time. The function of administrative
litigation has been improved in settling disputes, which has
promoted the reform of the administrative reconsideration and
petition mechanisms.
In general, the Amendment of the
Administrative Litigation Law has achieved the results of that
legislators desired and administrative litigation in China is
embracing the best ever period in its history.
The initial target of this Amendment is very humble. The
Amendment has aimed to solve the “three difficulties,” and thus it
has not prioritized expanding the functions of administrative
48
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[https://perma.cc/SAR7-LM2D].
49
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litigation. Court reviews of normative documents, collateral
reviews of local regulations, and acceptance of public interest
litigation were not implemented. The biggest problem that has
restricted administrative litigation, namely a full guarantee of the
independence and authority of administrative trial, has not been
solved by the Amendment. Solving this problem will require an
overall advancement of judicial and political reform. The deepseated problems that have troubled administrative litigation for
years still exist. Administrative trial still faces a difficult future.
Compared to administrative law enforcement and judicial
practices, legislation is the key factor and major symbol of legal
development. The Amendment of the Administrative Litigation
Law reflects the efforts to promote the rule of law in this era, as well
as the limitations to the process of law at this stage. If there is a gap
between the law and our expectations, it is because there is a gap
between the times we are in and the future we look forward to. We
appeal and criticize because we cherish such an ideal.
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